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UNCERTAINTY AND THE ADVANTAGE OF
COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENT
Howard M. Erichson*

INTRODUCTION

Judgments are printed in black and white; reality comes in shades of
gray. The settlement palette available to negotiating parties, unlike
the adjudication palette available to judges and juries, offers a range
of grays to suit the realities of uncertain liability, uncertain causation,
and uncertain damages. Settlement thus offers certain advantages
over adjudication. I am not referring to process advantages, such as
speed, economy, privacy, and relationship preservation. Rather, I am
referring to the idea that settlements may offer outcomes that more
accurately comport with justice under the relevant facts and law.
There is, of course, a long-running debate over whether settlement
in general should be embraced or eschewed. Owen Fiss famously declared himself to be "against settlement,"' and more recently reaffirmed his view that "[t]he bargaining that normally takes place
2
between litigants . . . has no connection to justice whatsoever."
Others, meanwhile, have urged that settlement serves public and private values better than adjudication.3
In this Essay, I do not intend to engage that broader debate, although it will be no secret that in many cases I see significant benefits
of settlement.4 Rather, this Essay explores a narrower question:
When numerous claimants assert similar claims against a defendant, to
what extent is justice particularly well served by collective settlement?
Are there advantages of collective settlement that are unavailable
* Professor, Fordham Law School.
1. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
2. Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDIHAM L. REV. 1273, 1277 (2009).
3. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1199 (2009); Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, Comment,
For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1664 (1985). For a helpful description of the range of
views from "litigation romanticists," who nearly always favor adjudication, to "ADR evangelists," who nearly always favor settlement, see Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1203-04 (2009).
4. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Foreword: Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement Divide, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117, 1123 (2009); Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate
Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 1771-80 (2005).
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through adjudication or through individual settlement? In particular,
can collective settlement address the problem of uncertainty more satisfactorily than can adjudication or individual settlement?
Part II breaks down the problem of uncertainty into categories because on closer examination, the advantages of settlement depend on
the types of uncertainty involved in a particular case.5 Looking at
product liability litigation, one can identify at least six significant areas
of potential uncertainty: (1) general causation, (2) liability, (3) exposure, (4) product identification, (5) individual causation, and (6) damages. Part III considers each of these six types of uncertainty in terms
of the relative advantages of individual adjudication, collective adjudication, individual settlement, and collective settlement-the four basic
ways in which mass litigation may be concluded. 6 While collective settlement in any case offers advantages of compromise and efficiency,
the justice advantages of collective settlement are most pronounced in
cases involving uncertainty regarding product identification, damages,
and above all, individual causation.
II.

THE WIDGIUM LITIGATION:

Six

CASES

This Essay explores the relationship between collective settlement
and the problem of uncertainty. But I should not mention "the problem of uncertainty" as if it were a single problem. One must talk
about problems of uncertainty in the plural. To explore the possible
advantages of collective settlement in dealing with uncertainty, I will
lay out six alternative stories, each reflecting a different type of uncertainty. With the problems of uncertainty sorted out-even if they
tend to overlap-it will be easier to consider which types of uncertainty present distinct opportunities for serving justice through collective settlement as opposed to individual settlement, individual
adjudication, or collective adjudication.
Consider the following hypothetical litigation: Widgetmaker, Inc.
manufactures widgets. The company has been sued by thousands of
consumers claiming that its widgets cause a particular type of cancer.
The plaintiffs rely on a recent scientific study finding a link between
cancer and exposure to widgium, a substance in the company's widgets. Widgetmaker undoubtedly faces several types of claims, including medical monitoring and increased risk claims from exposure-only
claimants, reduced value claims from consumers who purchased widgets, and securities claims from shareholders. For our purposes, how5. See infra notes 7-28 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 29-52 and accompanying text.
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ever, we will focus only on the tort claims of the plaintiffs who have
the particular type of cancer at issue and who assert that it was caused
by widgium.
A.

Case 1

The plaintiffs were exposed to widgium. The plaintiffs have cancer.
The parties dispute whether widgium causes cancer. One epidemiological study suggests a link between widgium and cancer, but another
study shows no statistically significant correlation. Although some
scientists have offered explanations for how widgium might cause cancer, the causal link remains unclear. At their depositions, experts for
the plaintiffs and the defendant offer competing testimony about
whether widgium can cause cancer.
In Case 1, general causation is uncertain. For a non-fictional example of Case 1, consider the litigation against Merrell Dow concerning
its anti-nausea drug Bendectin. In the Bendectin litigation, an early
mass tort, the most important area of uncertainty was whether
Bendectin caused birth defects.7 Indeed, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
8 the leading case on admissibility of expert testiPharmaceuticals,
mony, involved a challenge to the scientific basis for the plaintiffs' expert testimony in the Bendectin litigation.9 And in the Bendectin
multidistrict litigation, Judge Carl Rubin trifurcated a mass Bendectin
trial into phases so that the question of general scientific causation
could be addressed first; the defendant prevailed on that question and
was granted judgment as a matter of law.10 Case 1 also resembles the
claims of systemic disease in the breast implant litigation, where a significant question was whether silicone gel breast implants caused auto
immune disease and other systemic problems. Panels of scientific experts were appointed to examine this question by both Judge Sam
Pointer in the federal multidistrict litigation'" and Judge Robert Jones
7. See MICHAEiL D. GREEN, BE'NDECIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: TiHiE CHALLENGES OF MASS
Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 227, 331 (1996) (noting "the ambiguity, scarcity, and uncertainty
of the scientific evidence on Bendectin's teratogenicity"); see also Joseph Sanders, From Science
to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1993).
8. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
9. See id.; RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 37-38 (2007).
10. See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 296 (6th Cir. 1988).
11. See Order No. 31, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV92-P10000-S (N.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 1998); see also Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and InquisitorialJustice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 1989-91 (1999) (discussing the use of court-appointed experts in the breast implant litigation).
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in the District of Oregon. 1 2 The parties negotiated a nationwide settlement class action in the shadow of this uncertainty.13
B.

Case 2

The plaintiffs were exposed to widgium. The plaintiffs have cancer.
Widgium causes cancer, and the evidence is clear that it caused the
cancer of at least some of the plaintiffs. It is unclear, however,
whether any legal basis exists for holding Widgetmaker liable.
Widgetmaker asserts that despite widgium's potentially carcinogenic
properties, widgets are not defective products or unreasonably dangerous. Widgetmaker asserts that the warnings on its packaging were
adequate and that the company acted properly based on all the available information.
In Case 2, liability is uncertain. Case 2 may be subdivided to distinguish factual uncertainty from legal uncertainty. In Case 2(a), the
plaintiffs present some evidence that Widgetmaker may have withheld
information about widgium's carcinogenic properties, but
Widgetmaker insists that it did not withhold information. The evidence is unclear about what Widgetmaker knew and when. In other
words, Case 2(a) involves uncertainty about the facts related to liability. In Case 2(b), Widgetmaker had information that it chose not to
include in its warnings, but Widgetmaker asserts that any failure-towarn claim is preempted by a federal agency's approval of its widget
warning. The plaintiffs argue that preemption does not apply in this
setting. It is unclear how the court will rule on the preemption issue.
In other words, Case 2(b) involves uncertainty about the law related
to liability. In Case 2(c), it is clear that Widgetmaker had information
that it chose not to include in its warnings, and it is clear that the
plaintiffs' claims are not preempted by the federal agency approval.
However, Widgetmaker argues that its warning was adequate under
the common law standard, while the plaintiffs argue that
Widgetmaker should be liable for failure to warn. In other words,
Case 2(c) involves uncertainty about applying the facts to the law on
liability.
Case 2, in all of its permutations, resembles the tobacco litigation.
In the early years, tobacco litigation also looked like Case 1 as manu12. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392-93 (D. Or. 1996) (describing
the court's appointment and utilization of independent scientific advisors).
13. See Erichson, supra note 11, at 1991; David J. Morrow, Implant Maker Reaches Accord on
Damage Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1998, at Al.
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facturers questioned the link between cigarettes and cancer.14 But
even after it was beyond dispute that cigarettes cause cancer, the tobacco defendants continued to pursue defenses to liability, arguing
that they did not withhold information (Case 2(a)), that claims were
preempted (Case 2(b)), and that their conduct did not breach their
legal duties (Case 2(c)).15 Case 2 also resembles the Agent Orange
litigation, where the manufacturer defendants advanced several forceful arguments against liability, including the argument that if they had
supplied the defoliant as requested by the military, the governmentcontractor defense protected them from liability to Vietnam veterans
who were exposed to the chemical.' 6 The Agent Orange class action
settled in the shadow of uncertainty about liability; indeed, Judge Jack
Weinstein called on this uncertainty in convincing the plaintiffs that it
was in their interest to settle.' 7
C.

Case 3

The plaintiffs have cancer. Widgium causes cancer. The plaintiffs
allege that they were exposed to widgium, but Widgetmaker questions
whether the plaintiffs were exposed to widgium at all. The plaintiffs
have offered no proof of their exposure to widgium other than their
own testimony.
In Case 3, exposure is uncertain, creating uncertainty about individual causation. Case 3 resembles mass tort litigation concerning nonprescription products in which some of the plaintiffs who assert they
were exposed to the product cannot produce labels, receipts, or other
hard evidence of exposure.' 8 Even in pharmaceutical cases involving
prescription drugs, questions of exposure arise. These are largely disputes about credibility. Case 3 also resembles the Woburn leukemia
cluster litigation, in which one of the key issues was whether the
chemical TCE had made its way from the defendants' facilities into
14. See MICHAEL OREY,

ASSUMING TiE RISK:

TiHE

MAVERICKS, TiE LAWYERS, AND THE

WHISTLE-BLOWERS WHo BEAT BIG TOBACCo 36-37, 49 (1999) (quoting a 1986 interrogatory

response by American Tobacco Company-"There is a scientific controversy regarding the relationship, if any, between cigarette smoking and health"-and noting its similarity to the tobacco
companies' joint 1953 statement that "there is no proof that cigarette smoking is one of the
causes" of lung cancer).
15. See id.; PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR Of JUSTICE (1998); DAN
ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS: TIE LiGAi SIEGE ON THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
16. See PETER

H.

(2000).

SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIc DISASTERS IN THE

Couirs 61 (1986).

17. See id. at 159-63.
18. See Paul D. Rheingold, LITIGATING MASS TORT CASES § 7.16 ("In the L-tryptophan cases,
for example, considerable work was done to trace the product backward from the user to the
retailer to the wholesaler to the manufacturer.").
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the plaintiffs' drinking water.1 9 In the Woburn litigation, the dispute
over exposure was largely a question of geology rather than a question
of plaintiff credibility. Like Case 3, however, it involved uncertainty
about the plaintiffs' exposure to the product or substance at issue.
D.

Case 4

The plaintiffs have cancer. Widgium causes cancer. The plaintiffs
allege that they were exposed to widgium from Widgetmaker's widgets. The defendant does not necessarily contest the plaintiffs' exposure to widgium, but it questions whether the plaintiffs were exposed
to widgium from Widgetmaker widgets rather than from some other
source.
In Case 4, product identificationis uncertain. Like Case 3, this case
involves contested assertions of exposure that leave uncertainty about
individual causation. Case 4 resembles much of the asbestos litigation, where even if the plaintiffs' exposure to asbestos was undisputed,
it was often difficult for the plaintiffs to identify which company's asbestos-containing products they may have been exposed to. 2 0 Case 4
also resembles the diethylstilbestrol (DES) litigation, where even if
the plaintiffs knew that their mothers had taken DES, the fungibility
of the product and the time lag between a mother's ingestion and the
child's medical problems made it impossible for most of them to identify the manufacturer.2 1
E.

Case 5

The plaintiffs were exposed to widgium. The plaintiffs have cancer.
Widgium causes cancer. As to each individual, however, it is disputed
whether the individual's cancer was caused by widgium. The plaintiffs
point to epidemiological and other evidence to support their claim
that widgium caused their disease. But Widgetmaker points out that
the plaintiffs' cancer is not uncommon in the general population and
that it can be caused by factors unrelated to widgium. Experts for the
plaintiffs and the defendant offer conflicting testimony concerning
whether each plaintiff's disease was caused by widgium. It is a statistical certainty that widgium caused the cancer of at least some of the
plaintiffs, but it is equally certain that some of the plaintiffs would
19. See JONATHAN HARR, A Civii AcION 286-87 (1995).
20. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986).
21. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1989) ("Although strong
evidence links prenatal DES exposure to later development of serious medical problems . . .
identification of the manufacturer of the DES ingested in a particular case [is] generally impossible . . . .").
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have gotten cancer even if they had not been exposed to widgium; the
difficulty is knowing which of the plaintiffs fall into each group.
In Case 5, individual causation is uncertain. The question of individual medical causation has stood out as a key point of dispute in
mass tort litigation. In the litigation concerning Merck's painkiller Vioxx, eighteen trials occurred before a nationwide settlement was
reached; in those trials, the parties vigorously contested whether the
plaintiffs' heart attacks and strokes were caused by Vioxx, and Merck
directed attention to the plaintiffs' individual risk factors. 2 2 Similarly,
a major question in litigation over the hormone replacement therapy
Prempro was whether each plaintiffs breast cancer was caused by
Prempro. 2 3 Indeed, if one surveys the major mass torts-asbestos, tobacco, fen-phen, and so on-it is difficult to find any in which individual causation does not loom large. Questions about individual
causation are a primary reason why mass tort personal injury and
wrongful death cases rarely meet the predominance requirement of
Rule 23(b)(3) for class certification.
F

Case 6

The plaintiffs were exposed to widgium. The plaintiffs have cancer.
Widgium caused the plaintiffs' cancer. There is a basis for holding
Widgetmaker liable. The extent of each plaintiff's harm, however, is
disputed. Some of the plaintiffs claim significant lost income based on
optimistic career projections. Other plaintiffs claim future medical expenses based on pessimistic medical plans, optimistic life expectancies,
or both. The defendant disputes the extent of the plaintiffs' claimed
damages for pain and suffering, and so on.
In Case 6, the amount of damages is uncertain. To name mass torts
that involve this sort of uncertainty would be a bit silly; Case 6 resembles virtually every lawsuit ever filed. With minor exceptions such as
debt claims and claims for statutory damages or liquidated damages,
damages nearly always involve substantial uncertainty. Especially in
the realm of personal injury and wrongful death claims, it is impossible to imagine a case free from uncertainty about damages. As Alexandra Lahav puts it, "All tort damages are rough justice." 24 Noneconomic damages, such as compensation for pain and suffering, obvi22. See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELl
L. REv. 265, 276-79 (2011).
23. See, e.g., Amaris Elliott-Engel, PhiladelphiaJury Returns Defense Verdict in HRT Case,
THiE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 2010, at 5.

24. Alexandra D. Lahav, Rough Justice and the Problem of Value in Tort Law 2 (Mar. 2,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562677.
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ously require subjective evaluation and leave significant room for argument. 25 Economic damages, too, require subjective judgments and
predictions, and there is evidence that jurors tend to consider damages
holistically. 26
If subjectivity and uncertainty are unavoidable when calculating
compensatory damages, they are equally unavoidable and even more
prominent when calculating punitive damages. 27 Constitutional constraints create an upper limit on the amount of punitive damages, 28
but those constraints do not eliminate the inherent subjectivity of the
determination. Punitive damages, therefore, inject a substantial dose
of uncertainty into any case that presents a serious possibility that
such damages will be awarded.
III.

SETTLING THE WIDGIUM LITIGATION

Let's break down the possible outcomes of mass litigation along two
lines: adjudication versus settlement and individual versus collective.
This yields four basic possibilities as to how the litigation might be
concluded. First, each claimant's case may be resolved by individual
adjudication. By individual trials or by pretrial rulings such as summary judgment, courts may determine the outcome for each plaintiff.
Second, the claims may be resolved by collective adjudication. The
archetypical collective adjudication would be a class action verdict,
but collective adjudications may be achieved as well by other aggregation mechanisms such as joinder and consolidation as well as through
bankruptcy. Third, each claim may be resolved by individual settlement, negotiated by the defendant as to each plaintiff. Fourth, and by
far the most likely scenario, the claims may be resolved by collective
settlement. Collective settlements come in various procedural forms.
For purposes of this Essay, collective settlements include class settlements, non-class aggregate settlements, and collective negotiated resolutions in bankruptcy.
Looking at the six versions of the Widgium story laid out aboveeach of which involves a different aspect of uncertainty-what conclusions can we reach about the relative strengths of individual adjudication, collective adjudication, individual settlement, and collective
settlement in each situation? In particular, which of the stories and
25. See id. at 4.
26. Id. at 5.
27. See Byron G. Stier, Jackpot Justice: Verdict Variability and the Mass Tort Class Action, 80
TuMP. L. Rev. 1013, 1022-24 (2007).
28. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).

HeinOnline -- 60 DePaul L. Rev. 634 2010-2011

2011] UNCERTAINTY AND COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENT

635

variations suggest that collective settlements offer advantages for advancing justice in the face of uncertainty? I suggest that the advantage of collective settlement is most pronounced in three of the
scenarios: Case 4 (uncertainty about product identification), Case 5
(uncertainty about individual medical causation), and Case 6 (uncertainty about damages). In each of those cases, as I will explain, collective settlement offers special opportunities to create just outcomes in
the face of uncertainty.
In the other three scenarios-Case 1 (uncertainty about general
causation), Case 2 (uncertainty about liability), and Case 3 (uncertainty about exposure)-the advantage of collective settlement is less
clear. This is not to say that parties would not or should not settle in
these scenarios, or that they would not or should not settle collectively. Collective settlements in the face of these sorts of uncertainty
may advance goals of efficiency and finality and may well serve the
parties' objectives given the risks they face in the litigation.2 9 But
whereas Cases 1, 2, and 3 may result in sound collective settlements as
a matter of compromise and expediency, Cases 4, 5, and 6 present
distinct opportunities to achieve greater justice through settlement
than could be accomplished through either adjudication or individual
settlement. Above all, as I shall explain, certain instances of Case 5
offer ideal opportunities for using collective settlement to reach sound
resolutions.
A.

Case 1

Of the six scenarios, Case 1 presents the weakest justice-based case
for settlement. When general causation is uncertain, settlement may
disserve justice. If widgium in fact does not cause cancer, the tort justifications for extracting compensation from Widgetmaker are nonexistent. This is not to say that compensating persons with cancer would
serve no purpose, but only to say that if Widgetmaker bears no responsibility, then no purpose would be served by taking that compensation from Widgetmaker as opposed to taking it from a social
insurance scheme that spreads risk generally.
Of course, parties often choose to settle in the face of uncertainty
about causation. If the claims stand a significant chance of failure,
rational plaintiffs may decide to accept whatever they can get. Defendants may find it cheaper to settle than to fight general causation,
29. See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
InstitutionalAccount of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1634 (2004) ("Mass settlement structures emerge out of the play of precisely the private interests to which American tort
law claims allegiance.").
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at least if the plaintiffs' experts survive a Daubert challenge. Risk
aversion comes naturally to defendants facing mass litigation.3 0 But it
is one thing to say that settlement in the face of uncertain general
causation serves the interests of the parties and another thing to say
that it serves the interest of justice. Situations like Case 1 give the
strongest resonance to Fiss's contention that "settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society" rather than a determination of
a just outcome. 3 1
In the face of uncertainty about general causation, settlement may
be a sensible outcome, but its justification is one of necessity and compromise. We would not say that settlement does justice better than a
determination of whether widgium causes cancer. We might say, however, that we lack confidence in our litigation system to reach a reliable determination of whether widgium causes cancer 32 and that
settlement is justified in the face of the uncertainty created by an imperfect system of adjudication.
B.

Case 2

Both Case 1 and Case 2 involve uncertainty about whether
Widgetmaker bears any liability for the plaintiffs' cancer. To a large
extent, therefore, the same arguments apply to Case 2. If, in fact,
Widgetmaker has done nothing to subject itself to liability under the
applicable legal norms, then arguably justice is disserved by any outcome that extracts compensation from Widgetmaker.
Case 2 differs from Case 1, however, in that it is clear that
Widgetmaker's product caused injury. On strict liability theories of
cost-internalization, risk-spreading, and non-reciprocal risks, at least
some justifications exist for imposing costs on Widgetmaker to compensate the plaintiffs. Moreover, even if uncertainty exists concerning
the ultimate question of a defendant's liability, there may be evidence
of wrongdoing on the defendant's part.
Judge Weinstein, who oversaw the Agent Orange litigation, has
called that litigation an example of a case in which settlement was
"essential" to a just disposition of the case. 33 Significantly, he viewed
it as a case in which the defendants had acted wrongfully, notwith30. See Andrew T. Berry, Comments on Aggregation:Some Unintended Consequences of Aggregative Disposition Procedures,31 SErON HAi L. Ri-v. 920, 921 (2001).
31. Fiss, supra note 1, at 1075.
32. See GREEN, supra note 7, at 328 ("[lIt seems reasonably clear that no plaintiff should be
able to satisfy the burden of proof on causation in a Bendectin case. Yet, approximately 40
percent of all juries found for plaintiffs.").
33. Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement (1984), 78 FORDIiAM
L. Ri-v. 1265, 1268 (2009).
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standing his doubts about whether liability could be imposed through
adjudication:
Litigation would likely have resulted in the rejection of veterans'
claims based on the lack of scientific support as well as the manufacturers' government contractor and war powers defense.
Nevertheless, it was apparent that there had been some negligence in the production of Agent Orange and other herbicides ....
Excessive amounts of dioxin, a carcinogen, had been negligently incorporated in the herbicides supplied to the government. An appropriate resolution could only be achieved through settlement
34

Judge Weinstein saw the Agent Orange litigation as a case of uncertain liability and causation. He anticipated that without a settlement,
adjudication would result in zero liability-indeed, he later granted
summary judgment for the defendants against the plaintiffs who had
opted out of the class action. 35 But he pushed the settlement as the
only way to achieve "an appropriate resolution." 36 Judge Weinstein
evidently considered the class settlement a more "appropriate" resolution than a defense judgment, even though he considered himself
bound to issue such a judgment as a matter of law against the plaintiffs
who did not participate in the settlement. Whether others would
agree surely depends on the extent to which they define justice in
terms of the parameters of applicable law or in broader terms.
C.

Case 3

When there is uncertainty about a plaintiff's exposure to
Widgetmaker's product, does settlement achieve justice? The answer
may depend on whether the uncertainty flows from doubts about exposure to any widgium or doubts about product identification. In
other words, we must consider Case 3 (uncertainty about whether the
plaintiff was exposed to widgium) separately from Case 4 (uncertainty
about whether the plaintiff was exposed to Widgetmaker's widgium).
If a plaintiff was not, in fact, exposed to widgium, it is difficult to see
any justification for extracting money from Widgetmaker to compensate that plaintiff. If a plaintiff's allegation of exposure is a misrepresentation or a mistake, the policies of tort law are not served by a
settlement in which Widgetmaker compensates the plaintiff. In this
regard, the analysis of Case 3 follows the analysis of Case 1 (uncertainty as to general causation). As in Case 1, settlement may be justi34.
35.
affd,
36.

Id. at 1268-69.
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1264, 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
818 F.2d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 1987).
Weinstein, supra note 33, at 1269.
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fied, but the justification is one of compromise in the face of an
imperfect system of adjudicatory fact-finding.
D.

Case 4

The story looks quite different when uncertainty about exposure
follows from the difficulty of identifying the correct manufacturer of a
fungible product, as happened in much of the asbestos litigation and
DES litigation. In an individual lawsuit there may be no significant
difference between Case 3 and Case 4, but in a mass dispute they play
out differently.
Uncertainty about product identification presents a good opportunity for justice through collective settlement. If widgium causes cancer and a basis exists for holding widget manufacturers liable, but the
fungibility of the products renders it difficult to connect the dots between specific plaintiffs and defendants, then justice may come more
easily by collective settlement than by either adjudication or individual settlement. In the absence of a market-share liability rule or comparable alteration of standard tort causation requirements,37
adjudication would result in denial of liability for many plaintiffs. Yet
it may be clear that each of the plaintiffs was harmed by exposure to
widgium, and it may be equally clear, as a statistical matter, that
Widgetmaker's widgets caused harm to a portion of the plaintiffs. If a
collective settlement can be negotiated that includes a critical mass of
plaintiffs and a critical mass of defendants, such a settlement can direct compensation to the plaintiffs and direct liability to the defendants in amounts that approximately reflect the extent to which each
defendant's products caused harm to the plaintiffs as a group.
The question, then, is whether such a collective settlement is likely
to materialize. With a market-share liability rule in effect,38 such a
settlement may be possible, although collective action problems could
interfere as multiple defendants jockey for position. But if standard
tort requirements apply, each defendant may conclude that each
plaintiff would have little chance of success at trial, and thus it may be
unlikely that the defendants would agree to a settlement of Case 4 on
terms that reflect each defendant's actual responsibility for the harm.
On the other hand, if each plaintiff might be able to establish expo37. Market share liability has generally been rejected in non-DES cases. See, e.g., Santiago v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 195 (D. Mass. 1992); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543
F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
38. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 938 (Cal. 1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989).
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sure to the defendant's product, then a satisfying collective settlement
might become a possibility.
E.

Case 5

This is the case of the indeterminate plaintiff. Kenneth Abraham
describes this as "the class of cases in which an identified defendant
has caused injury, but it is not possible to prove which individuals the
defendant has injured." 39 This case offers significant potential for doing justice by collective settlement, but this advantage is likely to
come to fruition only in cases that display a particular version of causation uncertainty.
Suppose widgium from Widgetmaker's products caused the cancer
of 30% of the plaintiffs, and the probability is spread evenly among
the plaintiffs. That is, suppose each plaintiff can establish a 30% likelihood that widgium caused the plaintiff's cancer. In this scenario, the
defendant is likely to prevail against each and every plaintiff. The end
result in the under-50% indeterminate-plaintiff scenario is undercompensation and underdeterrence. 4 0 But it makes little difference, in
terms of the substantive outcome, whether the case ends in individual
adjudications, collective adjudication, individual settlements, or collective settlement. The defendant may pay nuisance value to settle
the claims, but as long as the plaintiffs must prove individual causation
by a preponderance of the evidence, a defendant is unlikely to offer
substantial compensation to settle claims in this scenario.
Suppose instead that widgium caused the cancer of 70% of the
plaintiffs, and the probability is spread evenly among the plaintiffs.
That is, suppose each plaintiff can establish a 70% likelihood that
widgium caused his cancer. Now, instead of the defendant prevailing
against every plaintiff, every plaintiff is likely to prevail. Under the
conventional approach to causation, each plaintiff in this scenario establishes but-for causation by a preponderance of the evidence; therefore, the defendant is liable to each plaintiff to the full extent of the
39. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND) FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAw 115 (2d ed. 2002).
40. Professor Abraham explains the underdeterrence problem when the evidence shows only
a 30% likelihood that each plaintiffs cancer was caused by the defendant's product:
In that scenario the defendant is less probably than not a but-for cause of any given
plaintiff's harm. The manufacturer therefore knows in advance that under the conventional approach to causation it will never be held liable for any of the harm that its
product causes. The conventional approach therefore cannot create its normal incentive effect in this situation, because the defendant does not face the prospect of "too
much" liability in some cases and "too little" in others. Instead there is always too little
liability (i.e., none) threatened.
Id. at 116-17.
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plaintiff's damages. 4 1 The end result in the over-50% indeterminateplaintiff scenario is excessive liability. Again, it makes little difference
for these purposes whether the case ends in individual adjudications,
collective adjudication, individual settlements, or collective settlement. Collective settlement may offer efficiency advantages, but it
does not solve the problem of overliability. As long as the parties are
bargaining in the shadow of the law, 4 2 and as long as the law offers full
damages upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence, this scenario
ends in overpayment.
In theory, the problems of underdeterrence and overdeterrence in
indeterminate-plaintiff cases could be addressed by reforming substantive tort law to permit proportional liability. If the substantive
law were changed to permit proportionate damages, collective adjudication would hold substantial appeal for resolving mass litigation involving indeterminate plaintiffs. 4 3 Proportional liability in Case 5
would be akin to market-share liability in Case 4. Professor Abraham
describes the idea of using proportional liability in the over-50% indeterminate-plaintiff scenario as radical to the point of infeasibility:
If proportional liability is designed to remedy underdeterrence, then
why not also use it to remedy overdeterrence? The answer, of
course, is that adopting this approach would require so radical a
shift in the way causation is determined and damages are calculated
that no one even imagines that we would do this across-the-board.
For both reasons, I think, there has been no real move to adopt
proportional liability in cases involving the indeterminate plaintiff.44
But actually, there has been something of a move to adopt proportional liability in cases involving indeterminate plaintiffs-not by adjudication, but by settlement. Let's call it proportional collective
settlement. The Vioxx settlement, for example, resolved approximately 50,000 claims of plaintiffs who asserted that their heart attacks
and strokes were caused by Merck's painkiller. 45 In a number of trials, the plaintiffs had presented strong evidence that Vioxx caused
heart attacks and strokes, but due to the commonness of heart attacks
and strokes and the existence of other risk factors, no plaintiff could
41. Depending upon whether the jurisdiction permits proof of causation by statistical evidence alone, this result may turn on whether each plaintiff supplements statistical evidence with
individualized forms of proof.
42. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALF L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
43. See generally David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. Ri-v. 849 (1984).
44. ABRAHAM, supra note 39, at 117.
45. See Vioxx Settlement Agreement (Nov. 9, 2007), available at www.merck.com/newsroom/
vioxx/pdflSettlementAgreement.pdf.
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be certain of prevailing on individual causation. 46 Nor could Merck
be confident that it would prevail, as a number of plaintiffs won jury
verdicts. 4 7 In the face of uncertainty in each plaintiffs case about
whether that plaintiff could establish causation, both sides saw a substantial benefit in negotiating a settlement that reduced the risk for
both sides.
Therein lies the key to the advantage of collective settlement in
cases of uncertain individual causation. For a collective settlement to
achieve justice by extracting compensation from a defendant in proportion to the likelihood that the defendant caused the plaintiff's
harm, both sides must face a risk.
Returning to the widgium litigation, suppose the situation is not
that each plaintiff can establish a 30% likelihood of causation (in
which case Widgetmaker is unlikely to settle for any amount beyond
nuisance value), but rather that each plaintiff has a 30% likelihood of
prevailing on the question of causation. If Widgetmaker knows that
each plaintiff has a 30% chance of prevailing, then it might rationally
negotiate a settlement for something along the lines of 30% of damages. Alternatively, suppose the situation is not that each plaintiff can
establish a 70% likelihood of causation (in which case the plaintiffs
are unlikely to settle for much less than full compensation), but rather
that each plaintiff has a 70% likelihood of prevailing on the question
of causation. If Widgetmaker knows that each plaintiff has a 70%
chance of prevailing, then a settlement in the 70% range seems plausible. Either way-whether the likelihood of each plaintiff's prevailing
is 30%, 70%, or anything else between 0 and 100-a proportional collective settlement is possible and holds the promise of imposing costs
on the defendant reflective of the harm the defendant caused.
Neither individual adjudications nor collective adjudication can provide as satisfactory a result in this scenario. From the perspective of
deterrence, individual adjudications could impose an appropriate level
of cost on the defendant. If each plaintiff has a 30% chance of prevailing, then in individual adjudications Widgetmaker would be required to pay full compensation to approximately 30% of the
plaintiffs. 48 Similarly, if each plaintiff has a 70% chance of prevailing,
then individual adjudications would impose liability on Widgetmaker
46. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 22, at 116.
47. See id.
48. To be clear, I am not suggesting that a series of individual trials would be a sensible way to
resolve the entire widgium litigation. Rather, the point of this exercise is to explore the potential
advantages of collective settlement relative to the outcome that would be had if each widgium
claim were to be individually adjudicated.
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totaling approximately 70%. Assuming the 30% or 70% odds reflect
approximately the percentage of the plaintiffs whose disease was
caused by widgium, the overall imposition of liability on Widgetmaker
should be in keeping with the harm its product caused. Thus, individual adjudications would not present a problem of either over- or underdeterrence. 49 The problem would be compensation. Rather than
compensating each plaintiff in proportion to the likelihood that widgium caused the plaintiff to get cancer, individual adjudications would
give full damages to some plaintiffs and zero damages to others.50
Collective adjudication presents a different problem. It presents
the risk of a single all-or-nothing judgment to govern the widgium
class or the group of joined widgium plaintiffs, with the possibility of
no liability and the possibility of full liability, neither of which would
accurately reflect the extent of harm imposed by Widgetmaker. It is
unlikely, however, that a case fitting the description of Case 5 would
result in a collective adjudication, because courts are reluctant to certify class actions or to order joint trials when individual causation is a
major issue.
In sum, Case 5 presents a golden opportunity for achieving a just
outcome by collective settlement, but only in the Vioxx-like scenario
where each plaintiff has a chance of prevailing and where the likelihood of each plaintiff's success reflects approximately the likelihood
that the defendant caused the plaintiff's harm. Perhaps the best way
to describe the scenario is that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
could win a summary judgment motion on the question of causation; a
reasonable jury could but need not find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant caused the plaintiff's harm.
F. Case 6

When liability and causation are clear and the only question is the
amount of damages, one might think that individual adjudications or
individual settlements would be the most sensible route for providing
each plaintiff with appropriate compensation. But there are strong
arguments that collective approaches may result in more accurate in49. See ABRAHAM, supra note 39, at 116.

[Tihe aims of deterrence are perfectly well served in ordinary cases by threatening the
same defendants with liability for 100 percent of the plaintiff's damages in some cases
and no liability in others, even when in each case there is only a probability of causation, higher than 50 percent when there is liability and lower than 50 percent when
there is not. ...
In the long run pretty much the right amount of liability probably is threatened and
imposed by this all-or-nothing approach in ordinary cases.
50. See Stier, supra note 27, at 1044.

HeinOnline -- 60 DePaul L. Rev. 642 2010-2011

2011] UNCERTAINTY AND COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENT

643

dividual compensation. As Michael Saks and Peter David Blanck
have argued, a collective approach to damages improves consistency
and arguably improves accuracy.5 1 Treating damages in the aggregate
reduces some of the variability in individual verdicts attributable to
different juries, lawyers, judges, and other non-merits factors. Alexandra Lahav takes the point a step further. She asserts that tort damages, by their very nature, are comparative: "Our system measures the
acceptability of tort damages by establishing a going rate through a
comparison of outcomes of similar cases." 52 In her view, collective
resolution-whether by adjudication or settlement-offers superior
justice because just outcomes may be defined only by reference to the
outcomes received by comparable claimants.
Punitive damages especially lend themselves to collective resolution
in mass disputes. Individual adjudications of punitive damages raise
the specter of windfalls to some plaintiffs and nothing to other plaintiffs, despite their having suffered harm due to the same conduct by
the defendant. It is harder to analyze the benefits of individual or
collective settlements for handling uncertainty about punitive damages, as defendants often insist that they are unwilling to settle claims
for punitive damages. But if Widgetmaker faces a realistic risk of punitive damages, it is reasonable to assume that the risk of punitive
damages factors into Widgetmaker's evaluation of its settlement position in the widgium litigation. The benefit of collective adjudication in
spreading punitive damages proportionally among the plaintiffs applies equally to collective settlement.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Settlements proceed in the face of uncertainty; indeed, uncertainty
can be a prime driver of settlements. Adjudications, too, proceed in
the face of uncertainty. In cases involving multiple claimants with related claims, settlements and adjudications can be handled individually or collectively. This Essay has explored the benefits of collective
settlements in the face of various types of uncertainty that arise in tort
litigation.
Certain types of uncertainty do not suggest any special advantage
for collective settlements. When general causation, liability, or exposure is uncertain, settlement may disserve justice. These types of uncertainty go to the core question of whether the defendant bears any
51. See Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits
of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 835 (1992).
52. Lahav, supra note 24, at 35.
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responsibility for the plaintiffs' harms. Settlements go forward in
these scenarios as a matter of expediency and risk-aversion and may
be justified on those grounds.
Other types of uncertainty, however, create scenarios in which collective settlements offer special advantages for achieving just outcomes. In the face of uncertainty about product identification, a
collective settlement could bridge gaps between multiple plaintiffs and
multiple defendants, but such a settlement may be unlikely in the absence of market-share liability or related doctrines.
When parties face uncertainty about individual causation, a collective settlement may offer an excellent opportunity for an outcome
that reflects proportional liability, even in the absence of a proportional liability rule of tort law. However, collective settlement offers
this advantage only when the uncertainty relates to the likelihood that
each plaintiff will prevail on causation. If causation is uncertain but it
is clear that each plaintiff can or cannot meet the preponderance standard, then collective settlement would reflect the same overliability or
underliability that would result from individual or collective
adjudication.
When liability and causation are clear but the amount of damages is
uncertain, collective resolution-whether by adjudication or settlement-offers the benefit of reducing variability and possibly providing greater accuracy. Particularly with regard to punitive damages,
collective resolution can serve the important function of reducing variable results among similarly situated claimants.
In the end, one scenario-uncertainty about each plaintiff's ability
to prevail on individual causation-presents the most promising opportunity for using collective settlement to accomplish just outcomes
that could not be achieved any other way. Moreover, among mass
disputes involving uncertain individual causation, it is possible to identify those disputes that present the most realistic opportunity for collective settlements to enhance the justice of outcomes.
One weakness in my analysis is that I have left "justice" largely undefined, relying instead on a relatively loose conception that to some
extent equates justice with the imposition of liability according to prevailing legal norms, and to some extent equates justice with compensation in proportion to the likelihood that a particular plaintiff's harm
was caused by the defendant. This may be an inadequate definition of
justice. And to the extent this implicit definition honors prevailing
legal norms on liability but nonetheless favors proportional compensation in dealing with indeterminate plaintiffs, it may be internally incoherent as well. But whatever definition of justice one chooses to
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apply when thinking about mass dispute resolution, it is worth asking
whether collective settlement offers advantages for achieving just outcomes so defined. On that front, I hope the analytical structure advanced in this Essay-breaking down the types of uncertainty and
considering how each plays out in the four basic types of outcomesproves useful.
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